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Abstract 
As part of its response to climate change the 1997 Kyoto Protocol envisages the employment of 
emissions trading schemes (“ETS”) to provide a market based incentive to reduce emissions and 
to engage in carbon sequestration activities. Such schemes would also serve to encourage the 
creation of an industry focused on energy conservation and alternatives to energy production – so 
called “green” or “clean” energy. 
 
Whilst a number of jurisdictions have introduced ETSs there is no definitive model. In 2010 the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (“TMG”) established an ETS and currently Australia has had a 
comprehensive nationwide regime in place since 1 July 2012. Notably the approaches adopted in 
the two jurisdictions have marked differences. 
 
It is proposed to compare the two regimes with a view to identifying lessons for ETS design and 
implementation. 
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A comparison of the Australian and Tokyo 
Emissions Trading Schemes 
1.0 Introduction 
Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol 1  developed countries collectively committed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels during 2008 to 2012. A core element 
of the Protocol was that a price should be set on greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
A primary mechanism to achieve this price was to be national emissions trading schemes 
(“ETS”) that might ultimately be linked thereby establishing a global market. A number of 
jurisdictions have now implemented ETSs. For example, the European Union (“EU”) 
implemented an ETS in 2005, New Zealand in 2008, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
(“TMG”) in 2010, Australia in 2012 and California from 2013. 
 
Whilst the current Australian Government proposes to repeal the Australian ETS effective 1 July 
2014 this decision is premised on an opposing philosophical perspective rather than a concern 
with the operational elements of the ETS. Essentially the Government is proposing that Australia 
should achieve its emissions reductions through taxpayer funded programs rather than using 
market forces.  
 
Meanwhile the TMG regime is being promoted as a blueprint for other sub-national jurisdictions, 
including Sydney.2  
 
It is proposed to compare the features of the two regimes with a view to identifying any lessons 
for ETS design.  
 
2.0 The Australian ETS 
The Australian ETS became effective 1 July 2012.3 The ETS operates as a fixed price regime 
until 1 July 20144 by which time it was intended that emissions caps would be imposed and 
trading expected to commence. The rationale for this reflected a view that Australia needed to be 
part of a global market for carbon permits that the then Government hoped would exist by 2014. 
1 To the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change available at www.unfccc.int (last visited 5 
October 2012). 
2 “Tokyo. The World’s carbon markets: a case study guide to emissions trading” Environmental Defense Fund, 
International Emissions Trading Association, September 2013 available at 
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF_IETA_Tokyo_Case_Study_September_2013.pdf  (last visited 4 March 
2014). (“IETA Tokyo”) 
3  See http://www.climatechange.gov.au/media/whats-new/clean-energy-legislative-package.aspx (last visited 11 
November 2012). For discussion and analysis see: Rosemary Lyster, “Australia's Clean Energy Future Package: Are 
we there yet?” (2011) 28 (6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 446 and Murray Wilcox and Michael Rennie, 
Australian emissions trading law, Thomson Reuters 2012. 
4 The unit price is fixed until 1 July 2014, for the first year at AUD$23 per tonne and then rising at 2.5% pa in real 
terms, purchased from the Government and immediately surrendered. Note that the date was brought forward from 1 
July 2015 as initially proposed. 
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Interim operation as a fixed price avoided the potential for price volatility, a strong possibility 
given the small size of the Australian domestic market, with its potential negative impact on 
achieving behavioral change and encouraging investment in green energy technology. 
 
This hybrid nature of the regime required the Government to set the initial price. This exercise 
involved a tradeoff between environment integrity and cost containment. Business interests 
referred to the price at which carbon permits were trading in Europe (then around AUD$15) 
whilst environmentalists pointed to analysis that suggested a price around AUD$130 was 
necessary to drive investment in renewable energy. Ultimately the price of AUD$23 for the first 
year was selected as a compromise. 
 
The relevant features of the regime, including the future elements now in doubt,5 can be outlined 
as follows:6 
• The top 294 “large” emitters of carbon dioxide are to purchase an eligible emissions 
unit (“EEU”) per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted each year from facilities over 
which they have operational control (with no cap imposed until 2014). 7 “Large” 
emitters are entities that emit 25,000 metric tonnes 8  or more of carbon dioxide 
annually (or the equivalent) 9 with entities required to calculate emissions and be 
subject to audit.  
 
• Those entities affected are to report carbon emissions for a financial year to the Clean 
Energy Regulator 10 (“CER”) whose function is to ensure the accuracy of these 
reports and impose penalties if insufficient EEUs are purchased. 11  Whilst the 
compliance year ends 30 June, the requisite units are not required to be surrendered 
until 1 February in the following year (at least under the fixed price regime). 
 
• From 1 July 2014 the fixed price EEUs would be replaced by a “cap and trade” ETS 
with annual caps on emissions to be set five years in advance. That is, in 2014 caps 
would be set for the first five years of the ETS with the caps extended each year after 
the scheme commences. 
 
5 A new Coalition Government elected in September 2013 has tabled legislation repealing the current ETS effective 
1 July 2014 prior to the trading mechanism commencing. 
6 A detailed summary of the legislation and surrounding issues is available in the Bills Digest no. 68 2011–12 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1112a/12bd068 (last visited 11 
November 2012). 
7 Some businesses not liable under this scheme are subject to an equivalent carbon price through reductions to fuel 
tax credits arrangements. Whilst the Government estimated that around 60% of Australia’s emissions would be 
covered by the ETS with other measures there is a carbon price effectively imposed on 2/3rds of all emissions: 
Australian Government, Carbon pricing mechanism: who is liable?, available at 
http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/500-companies/ (last visited 6 March 2013). 
8 Some landfill operators emitting 10,000 tonnes or more and certain natural gas retailers are also caught.  
9 The ETS applies to four of the six greenhouse gases acknowledged in the Kyoto Protocol. 
10 By 31 October.  
11 Initially at 130% of the cost of acquiring an EEU. Under the market mechanism the charge would be double the 
average price of units for the year. 
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• Limited borrowing of EEUs from future years would be permitted. A liable entity 
would be able to borrow up to 5% of EEUs from future years and use those EEUs to 
meet their current year liability.  
 
• Unlimited banking of EEUs would be allowed.12 
 
• EEUs would be allocated by auction in most cases. No EEUs from the fixed price 
period could be carried over to the full ETS. 
 
• Australian Carbon Credit Units (“ACCU”) could be used to satisfy emissions 
obligations.13 ACCUs are generated through certain farming and forestry activities – 
known as the carbon farming initiative.14  
 
• Emissions intensive trade exposed (“EITE”) industries (such as steel, aluminum, zinc 
and glass production) receive substantial assistance in the form of free units, covering 
up to 94.5% of their liability during the fixed price period. Free EEUs were also 
issued to coal-fired electricity and gas suppliers15 and tax cuts, pension increases and 
other compensatory government payments were implemented by way of household 
assistance.16 
 
• The agricultural sector is exempted. Gasoline is also exempted but large diesel and jet 
fuel users were subject to increases in excise taxes.17  
 
Linking with the EU 
Shortly after the scheme came into effect it was announced that it would be fully linked to the 
EU ETS by 1 July 2018.18 As an interim measure from 1 July 2015 (since presumably 2014)19 
Australian entities would be able to use EU allowances to satisfy their obligations.  
 
To facilitate linking the then Government announced that it would not proceed to implement a 
floor price as originally proposed. The decision to drop the price floor was controversial.20 First, 
12 But not of freely allocated units during the fixed price period, although these may be sold back to the Government.  
13 During the fixed price period up to a cap of 5% of the emissions obligations only. 
14 This initiative commenced in December 2011 and provides for credits to be issued on the basis of approved 
projects that reduce or avoid greenhouse gas emissions and/or increase carbon storage or sequestration: see 
http://www.daff.gov.au/climatechange/cfi (last visited 5 October 2012). 
15 For coal-powered electricity generators, only in the first four years and up to a cap and subject to passing certain 
criteria. 
16 Ranging from increased social security payments and family assistance to tax rate cuts and other tax reduction 
measures. Small businesses also received assistance in the form of accelerated tax deductions.  
17 In the case of fuel for heavy road transport the exemption applies only for the first two years. 
18 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency media release, 28 August 2012 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-916_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom (last visited 11 November 
2012). Subsequently see: Clean Energy Legislation Amendment (International Emissions Trading and Other 
Measures) Act 2012 available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r4895 
(last visited 21 April 2013). 
19 See footnote 4: with the proposal to move to a market pricing mechanism a year earlier it might be expected that 
EU credits could be utilized from the earlier date as well.  
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price parameters provided some certainty for business planning. Secondly, there was a risk that 
the EU allowances would continue to price carbon much lower than the Australian Government 
forecasts.21 This would impact adversely on Australian Government revenue streams and the 
environmental objectives of the Australian regime. 
 
The Government continued to propose a price ceiling, although it would be set by reference to 
the expected price of EU allowances. A price ceiling is a cost containment measure, providing 
some protection for Australian entities from an unanticipated spike in the carbon price. Notably 
the existence of such a measure is problematic to linkage. Linking schemes were one has a price 
ceiling and the other does not presents arbitrage opportunities and could undermine the 
environmental integrity of both schemes.22  
 
Under the original Australian regime, Australian entities were to be able to use most Kyoto 
units.23  Between 2015 and 2020 Australian emitters were to be able to source 50% of their 
required allowances from international sources (rising to 100% from 2020). With the agreement 
to link with the EU regime a new sub-limit would apply to Kyoto units. Whilst entities would 
still be able to meet up to 50% of their liabilities through purchasing eligible international 
allowances, only 12.5% of their liabilities would be able to be met by Kyoto units. This made it 
more likely that Australian entities wishing to acquire international allowances would embrace 
the EU market. Furthermore, it provided some additional protection against the availability of 
“hot air” allowances asserting downwards pressure on the carbon price.24  
 
3.0 Japanese Developments – The TMG Scheme 
Background - procrastination at the national level 
Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol, Japan committed to reducing its emissions by 6% relative to 
1990 levels by 2012. A small scale voluntary ETS targeting small and medium sized businesses 
20 For example, see the Parliamentary debate for 10 October 2012 reported in Hansard at p 11932 available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012B00173 (last visited 21 April 2013). 
21 At the time of writing the European market is pricing carbon at around AUD$5 a tonne. 
22 Hitomi Kimura and Andreas Tuerk, Emerging Japanese emissions trading schemes and prospects for linking, 
Climate Strategies October 2008 (“Kimura and Tuerk 2008”) available at www.climatestrategies.org (last visited 5 
November 2012). 
23 The Protocol established three market based mechanisms under which carbon permits might be effectively traded. 
Initially developed countries receive an assignment of units relative to their emissions “budget” (known as assigned 
amount units (“AAUs”). Developed countries are also granted removal units (“RMUs”) in relation to domestic 
activities resulting in the net removal of greenhouse gases. RMUs and AAUs may be converted into emission 
reduction units (“ERUs”), the later through a “joint implementation project”, namely a project that allows developed 
countries to work together by jointly implementing initiatives that reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, 
there are certified emission reduction units (“CERS”) generated from developed countries investing in projects that 
either reduce emissions or sequester carbon in sinks in developing countries, the so-called “clean development 
mechanism” designed to draw developing countries within the Protocol. The intention was that CERs and ERUs can 
be used by countries to comply with their emission limitation targets under the Protocol or by operators of 
installations covered by domestic ETSs in order to meet their carbon emission obligations or can be assigned to 
other countries. Under the Australian ETS it was proposed that the following international units might be used: most 
certified ERUs from CDMs, ERUs from JI projects and RMUs. Furthermore, the Government had stated that the 
types of international allowances recognized by both the EU and NZ ETSs and the restrictions on their use would be 
taken into account in determining which are acceptable to Australia. 
24 As to “hot air” see the discussion in Frank Jotzo and Regina Betz, “Australia’s emissions trading scheme: 
opportunities and obstacles for linking” (2009) 9 Climate Policy 402. 
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(“SMEs”) was commenced in 2005.25 In 2008 this morphed into an experimental voluntary ETS 
that also encompassed a trial ETS based on a voluntary action plan established by the 
Keidanren26 and the verified emissions reduction scheme, a program allowing for credits to be 
generated through the reduction/removal of greenhouse gases employing sinks implemented 
pursuant to domestic projects.27  Although legislation directed at a 2013 start date was proposed, 
in response to sustained business resistance28 it was deferred.29 Then the triple disasters of 2011 
made the introduction of a policy imposing further imposts on the economy inconceivable for the 
time being. 30 The Government has even admitted that its 2010 United Nations climate change 
conference pledge to reduce emissions by 25% relative to 1990 by 2020 was no longer viable.31  
 
It could be expected that the revival of any proposal to introduce a broad based ETS will 
continue to encounter industry resistance, especially from the powerful Keidanren business 
association. Furthermore, the difficulties presented by the Japanese political system of 
formulating and implementing policy involving multifaceted political issues, such as 
environmental reforms embracing fiscal measures, should not be underestimated.32  
25 Going by the acronym “JVETS”, a regime based on the EU system. Unfortunately this scheme had only attracted 
a small number of participants. For participating firms, one third of the cost of new facilities to reduce emissions 
was borne by the Government. Firms were initially allocated emission allowances and set targets (absolute not 
intensity based). Those that failed to achieve their targets could purchase excess credits from firms that had 
exceeded their targets (or use j-CERS from Clean Development Mechanism projects) or return the subsidy to the 
Government: Stephanie Monjon, Implementation of an emission trading scheme in Japan: some food for thought, 
Climate Strategies October 2011 (“Monjon 2011”) available at www.climatestrategies.org (last visited 5 November 
2012). JVETS was apparently introduced as a voluntary scheme only, due to strong opposition from industry and the 
Ministry for the Economy, Trade and Industry. It was only of limited effectiveness as many major emitters did not 
join, targets did not require deep reductions and penalties were not severe: Hitomi and Tuerk 2008, supra. 
26 Operating since 1997 and based on the voluntary adoption of intensity targets.  
27 Going by the acronym “JVER”. This regime is similar to the Australian carbon farming initiative allowing for the 
creation of credits through carbon sequestration activities. Note that a Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism (“BOCM”) 
is also being developed to enable Japanese entities to generate credits through emission reduction focused joint 
engagement with developing countries: see 
http://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2012/ghg/3_TSUTSUMI_IEAIETAEPRI2012.pdf (last visited 30 October 
2012). On the two trial schemes see J. Mochizuki, “Assessing the designs and effectiveness of Japan’s emissions 
trading scheme” (2011) 11 Climate Policy 1337 – 1349 available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2011.579289#preview (last visited 13 November 2012). 
28 For example, see “Japan industry unites against carbon tax” (Dec 7, 2009) available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/12/07/climate-japan-idUKTOE5B609U20091207 (last visited 5 November 2012). 
29 As to the experimental regime and the details of the December 2010 draft proposal see: Xianbing Liu, Kazunori 
Ogisu, Sunhee Suk and Kinichi Sudo, “GHG emissions trading schemes in Northeast Asia: an overview and analysis 
of current scenarios” in Larry Kreiser, Ana Yabar Sterling, Y Pedro Herrera, Janet E Milne and Hope Ashiabor (eds) 
Carbon pricing, growth and the environment, Abingdon Oxon Edwards Elgar Publishing 2012. Some of the political 
tradeoffs inherent in the design of the ETS are identified in Stephanie Monjon, Implementation of an emission 
trading scheme in Japan: some food for thought, Climate Strategies October 2011 available at 
www.climatestrategies.org (last visited 5 November 2012). 
30 On the ETS in Japan generally see the Ministry of the Environment website at 
 http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech.html (last visited 13 November 2012). 
31  Leo Shanahan, “Japan’s energy crisis puts ETS launch on ice” The Australian (February 29, 2012). The 
experimental ETS continues but solely on a voluntary basis with participating entities establishing their own 
emissions reduction targets although verification by the Government is a pre-requisite to any trading. Notably Japan 
is not supporting an extension to the Kyoto Protocol. 
32 Discussed in Liu Xianbing, Ogisu Kazunori, Suk Sunhee and Shishime Tomohiro, “Carbon tax policy progress in 
north-east Asia” in Larry Kreiser, Julsuchada Sirisom and Hope Ashiabor, Nov 01, 2011, Environmental Taxation in 
China and Asia-Pacific, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, ISBN: 9780857937766 at p.116. In particular, the 
Ministries of Environment (“MOE”), Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”), Land Infrastructure, Transport, 
Tourism (“MLIT”), Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“MAFF”) and Finance (“MOF”). Also see S. Rudolph and 
7 
 
                                                 
Japan also surprised many observers by its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol at the end of the 
first commitment period. 33  With this withdrawal and a change of Government in 2012 the 
country’s climate change policy, including its emissions reductions commitment, has been 
reoriented away from domestic reductions to providing emissions reduction technology to 
developing nations.34  
 
The TMG regime35 
Against this background of procrastination at the national level, cap and trade ETSs have 
operated in Tokyo and Saitama 36 since 1 April 2010 and 2011 respectively. Although sub-
national schemes, they are not insignificant. For example, Tokyo’s greenhouse gas emissions 
totaled 59.6 million tonnes in 2006 putting it on par with countries such as Denmark and 
Norway.37 
 
In the first two years of operation of the TMG regime emissions reductions of 23% have been 
reported 38 suggesting that it has been highly successful. The features of the regime can be 
outlined as follows:39 
• The scheme is mandatory and covers approximately 1,400 commercial and public 
facilities that have a total consumption of fuels, heating and electricity of at least 1,500 
kilolitres per year (crude oil equivalent applying a conversion factor to other energy 
sources consumed). It is, thus, a downstream scheme focusing on indirect emissions and 
covers around 20% of total carbon dioxide emissions in Tokyo.40 
 
• Whilst the scheme only applies to energy related carbon dioxide emissions if a track 
record of total emissions reductions for greenhouse gases other than energy related 
S. J. Park, “Lost in Translation? The political economy of market-based climate policy in Japan” in C. Dias Soares 
et al (ed), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation Volume VIII, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, 163. 
33 The rationale for Japan’s decision is discussed in Andrew Light, “Has Japan killed the Kyoto Protocol?” Center 
for American Progress website article dated 8 December 2010 available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2010/12/08/8733/has-japan-killed-the-kyoto-protocol/ (last 
visited 11 March 2013). 
34 See Justin Dabner and Satoshi Kurokawa, “Japan’s new direction on climate change” East Asia Forum (3 July 
2013) available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/03/japans-new-direction-on-climate-change/ (last visited 
22 August 2013). 
35 Generally see Stefan Niederhafner, “The governance modes of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Emissions 
Trading System” (2013) available at http://hdl.handle.net/10086/26005  (Niederhafner 2013). 
36 The Saitama regime substantially replicates the Tokyo regime but is a voluntary arrangement (in the sense that 
there are no sanctions for non-compliance) that applies to around 600 entities. Allowances are provided and these 
may be traded. Again offsets are available. Agreement was reached to link the two regimes in September 2010: 
Monjon 2011, supra. 
37 Tokyo cap-and-trade program: Japan’s first mandatory emissions trading scheme, March 2010, Bureau of the 
Environment, Tokyo Metropolitan Government (“BOE 2010”). 
38 The Tokyo cap-and-trade program achieved 23% reduction in the 2nd year, TMG media release, 21 January 2013. 
39  See The Tokyo Metropolitan Environmental Security Ordinance “Tokyo cap-and-trade program” for large 
facilities <Detailed Documents>, Bureau of Environment, TMG, 30 March 2012 available at 
www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/climate/ (last visited 7 April 2013). 
40  Sven Rudolph and Takeshi Kawakatsu, Tokyo’s greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme: a model for 
sustainable megacity carbon markets?, Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No 25-2012 (“Rudolph 2012”) 
available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/25-2012_rudolph.pdf (last visited 4 
March 2013). 
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carbon dioxide can be independently verified such entities may be permitted to use these 
reductions to fulfill their carbon dioxide reduction obligations.41 Notably 95% of Tokyo’s 
emissions are carbon dioxide energy based emissions.42 
 
• Entities affected must reduce their carbon dioxide emissions based on (absolute) caps or 
cover any excess emissions by purchasing emissions allowances from other entities 
covered by the scheme.  
 
• Alternatively, entities may satisfy their obligations by acquiring offset credits from four 
other sources. More particularly, renewable energy certificates granted to suppliers 
generating electricity through renewable resources may be acquired and relied on,43 SME 
facilities within the Tokyo area (ie too small to be covered by the ETS) that implement 
energy saving measures resulting in verifiable emission reductions can be issued with 
credits which may be acquired by liable entities,44 and from 2015 limited credits45 will 
also be available in relation to verified emissions reductions by large entities outside the 
TMG program.46 Credits issued under Saitama’s regime may also be relied on. Saitama 
credits may include both those acquired from entities to which its ETS applies and from 
SMEs that have implemented energy saving measures resulting in verified emissions 
reductions. 
 
• Five year commitment periods are mandated. Under the 2010 to 2014 period the cap is 
set at a 6 or 8% reduction in the base year emissions47 with a second commitment period 
reduction set at 17%. Whilst this would seem to reflect a relatively stringent requirement, 
such that TMG expects allowance prices to increase to up to US$150 per tonne in the 
second period,48 in fact due to both the economic downturn and, possibly, the effect of 
41 Whilst these reductions cannot directly give rise to tradable credits the counting of such reductions may result in 
excess reductions that can otherwise be converted to tradable credits. This measure is expected to only apply to a 
handful of facilities known to the TMG: Meeting with TMG officials, 5 April 2013. 
42 Kyle DuPont (Padeco Co Ltd), Cities and climate change mitigation: case study on Tokyo’s emissions trading 
system, World Bank May 2010 (“DuPont 2010”) available at 
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-
1226422021646/Tokyo_ETS_Padeco.pdf (last visited 4 March 2013) and see 
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-
1226422021646/Directions5.pdf?resourceurlname=Directions5.pdf (last visited 4 March 2013). 
43 See DuPont 2010 at page 2-9 for discussion of the green electricity certification (and also the city solar energy 
bank) initiatives that may give rise to these credits. 
44 BOE 2010 at paragraph 3.4.1. 
45 These may only be used to satisfy one third of a facility’s reduction obligations. 
46 Registration is required along with adherence to monitoring, reporting and verification rules. Credits up to one 
third of a company’s obligations only may be relied upon. 
47 6% for factories and most buildings, otherwise 8% for buildings and facilities in which air conditioning and 
heating from district cooling and heating plants make up 20% or less of energy consumption. Base year emissions 
are calculated as the average of any three consecutive years between FY2002 and FY2007. Updating of the 
permitted emissions is available upon a change in floor space, purpose of use or amount of equipment used. There is 
also scope to ameliorate this reduction level for the following fiscal year period (by ½ or ¼) if certification as having 
made outstanding or excellent progress with regards to the implementation of measures against global warming is 
obtained and this can be maintained. One rationale for this measure is to accommodate (mainly) new businesses that 
had already achieved substantial emissions reductions and might find it difficult to achieve further significant 
reductions from the base year amounts. 
48 Rudolph 2012 at section 3.1.  
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energy rationing following the Fukushima incident, the first commitment period caps 
have already been met in the first two years.49 
 
• Allowances are allocated free of charge according to the grandfathering method based on 
the base year emissions adjusted for the 6 or 8% reduction. A reserve of allowances is 
maintained to be issued to new entrants based on their average actual emissions over two 
to three years.50 Where emissions levels fall below 1,000 kilolitres for the previous year 
or 1,500 kilolitres for three consecutive years the facility may leave the program. 
 
• Emissions reports lodged with TMG are to be verified by a registered third party 
verification agency. The calculation of emissions is based on the consumption of gas and 
electricity converted to carbon dioxide equivalent emissions measured in metric tonnes 
using an emissions factor. This factor is fixed irrespective of changes in the way in which 
electricity is generated and thus has not been adjusted for an increase in coal fired 
electricity generation with the shutdown of nuclear power stations.51 Overall though, the 
monitoring, reporting and verification procedures are thorough.52 
 
• Penalties are imposed in the event of a breach of the emissions cap.  At first instance the 
entity will be ordered to acquire credits (or make reductions) equal to 1.3 times the 
shortfall. If this order is not complied with then punishment can include fines of up to 
Y500,000 (payment of which does not absolve the breach), publication of the breach and 
payment of compensation to TMG for purchasing allowances on behalf of the non-
compliant entity. Other penalties apply, for example for failing to lodge a report.53  The 
penalty system is considered stringent.54 
 
• Each facility has an account with the Registry of Reductions. A record needs to be made 
when acquiring, transferring or using excess reduction or offset credits to fulfill 
obligations. Only excess credits beyond the annual reduction obligations may be traded 
once the reductions have been verified and converted into credits in a trading account 
upon application. 55  Excess credits up to half of the entity’s base year emissions 
calculation may be sold. TMG has no part in the sales process other than to provide a 
website for participants to engage via and the holding of annual “matching” seminars. It 
49 93% of covered facilities have already reduced their emissions by in excess of the required first commitment 
period amount by the end of the second year with 70% having also achieved their likely second commitment period 
reductions of 17%: The Tokyo cap-and-trade program achieved 23% reduction in the 2nd year, TMG media release, 
21 January 2013. 
50 With the execution of specified energy saving measures assumed, thereby denying new entrants the opportunity to 
inflate their allowance. 
51 Although it may be for the second compliance period: Meeting with TMG officials, 5 April 2013. 
52 Rudolph 2012 at section 2.2. 
53 Generally see http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/kouhou/english/index.html (last visited 13 November 2012). 
54 Rudolph 2012 at section 3.1. 
55 In contrast to the EU regime that allows for trading prior to verification. The rationale for the TMG procedure is 
to encourage facilities to rely primarily on reduction strategies rather than trading: DuPont 2010 at appendix 2. In 
the year following the end of the five year commitment period credits will automatically be entered into the trading 
account once excess reductions are verified by TMG. 
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has been suggested that the trading mechanism results in high transaction costs and 
hampers the efficiency of the market.56 
 
• As with the commitment period, the compliance period is also five years. Whilst an 
emissions report must be lodged by the end of November each year, and any reductions 
exceeding the annual obligations may be traded once verified by TMG, any deficiencies 
do not need to be made up (through purchases of credits) until the end of the five year 
commitment period. In lieu of selling credits arising from excess reductions at the end of 
the first commitment period they may be banked and used in the second commitment 
period57 but borrowing for the purposes of trading is not allowed. 
 
• TMG reserves the power to implement certain measures to intervene in the market to 
contain the cost of allowances. In particular, the supply of allowances may be increased 
by expanding the supply of offset credits, for example from reduction activities by SMEs 
or, as a further measure, increasing the use of credits from outside Tokyo or enabling the 
use of Kyoto credits (which otherwise are not accepted). It is not expected that this 
measure would be utilized except in extreme circumstances and following consultation.58 
 
4.0 Comparing the Australian and TMG regimes 
All ETSs involve a trade off between environmental effectiveness and cost containment. How 
this trade off is struck determines the features of the regime and its level of ambition. 
Additionally both institutional and constitutional considerations can impact on ETS design. 
 
A comparison of some of the main features of the two regimes is attempted in the table below 
followed by an analysis of some of the differences. For these purposes it is assumed that the 
proposals of the former Australian Government are honoured. 
56 Ibid. Rudolph identifies that no market has yet been established with the reluctance to trade demonstrated by the 
fact that only 200 facilities (17%) had so far opened an account which would enable them to acquire tradable credits. 
See DuPont 2010 for a description as to how the market operates (at page 2-9). 
57 Replication for the second and third commitment periods is not currently anticipated: Meeting with TMG officials, 
5 April 2013. 
58 Meeting with TMG officials, 5 April 2013. 
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Table 1 - Comparison of the design features of the Australian and TMG ETSs  
 
Design Feature Australian ETS (proposed from 1 July 2018) TMG ETS 
 
 
  
Type of target Absolute Absolute 
Ex-post adjustment Not proposed. No 
Price cap and/or market intervention 
(cost containment) measures 
Price cap at AUD$20 above expected EU 
carbon price for 2014/15 until 2018.  No other 
intervention measures. 
Emergency measures to sell additional 
allowances. 
Borrowing Up to 5%. Prohibited 
Continuance Ongoing Ongoing (confirmed thru to 2019 at this stage) 
Banking Unlimited Limited to use in commitment period two. 
Commitment periods Annual – specified five years in advance. Five years. 
Target stringency To be specified from 2014.  Currently trade 
exposed industries receive substantial 
concessions in the form of free units. 
6-8% in the first commitment period. 17% for 
second period (2015 – 2019). Concessions 
available for entities implementing exceptional 
measures. 
Limits on foreign allowances 50% foreign (100% from 2020) 12.5% Kyoto 
units sub-limit.  
No foreign allowances recognized. 
Other domestic offsets/credits Carbon farming initiative Renewable energy credits, Tokyo SME 
reduction credits, outside Tokyo large entity 
reduction credits (from 1 April 2015), Saitama 
credits.  
Level of compulsion, governance and 
enforcement 
Mandatory (Clean Energy Regulator (“CER”)) Mandatory (Bureau of the Environment 
(“BOE”)) 
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Design Feature Australian ETS (from 1 July 2018) TMG ETS 
 
Compliance (trading) period Annual (1 July – 30 June) Annual (1 April – 31 March) 
Monitoring, verification and reporting  Reports of large emitters (125,000 tonnes p.a.) 
must be audited. Other audits by the CER 
possible. 
Detailed reporting rules, independent 
registered verification agencies and competent 
BOE supervision. 
Sanctions for shortfalls 200% of the average price of units for the year. Credits equal to 1.3 times the shortfall to be 
acquired, fine up to ¥500,000 and naming. 
Leakage control Trade exposed industries receive concessions. None 
Level of application Upstream bias (large emitters) Downstream bias (large energy consumers) 
Sector and gas coverage Large emitters in most sectors nationwide.  
Four types of gases covered (60% of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions). 
Large consumers of fuels, heating and 
electricity in the TMG area.  Primary focus on 
CO2 (20% of Tokyo’s CO2 emissions). 
Allocation of allowances Auction (some free allocations) Grandfathering (with limited updating) 
New entrants and business closure General structure accommodates most issues. Detailed rules. 
Registries and trading mechanism Online registry maintained by the CER. Units 
tradeable by account holders once acquired.  
Auctions by the CER expected to set price 
signal. Units measured in per tonne of CO2.  
 
Online registry maintained by TMG.  
Tradeable allowances on application following 
TMG verification of emissions reductions.  
Website and matching seminars to facilitate 
trade.  Allowances up to half base year 
emissions may be traded. Allowances 
measured in per tonne of CO2.   
Kyoto Protocol (allowances shadowed by 
Kyoto units – ie. convertible to ERUs) 
Unspecified. No 
Existing linkage partners Full linkage with EU proposed 1 July 2018. Saitama 
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Absolute targets and ex-post adjustments  
An ETS may mandate that entities not exceed targets expressed as emissions per unit of output or 
activity or even per unit of input. These are known as intensity or relative targets. One limitation 
of such targets is that emissions may continue to increase as a result of increases in activity. They 
are thus more liberal than absolute targets which are set by reference to the historical emissions 
(“grandfathering”) with a reduction factor applied or “benchmarking”. 
 
Emissions limits are specified over a period usually described as the “commitment period” and 
are typically established at the start of that period. However some regimes allow for subsequent 
adjustments as a price controlling measure. Such a measure could enable politically-motivated 
market influence and undermine the market.59  
 
The absolute nature of the targets of both regimes and the lack of any ex-post adjustment 
mechanism enhances their environmental integrity.  
 
Price cap and cost containment measures 
Unsurprisingly both regimes contain cost containment measures. In the case of TMG the right to 
adopt emergency measures is reserved should the price rise too high. In Australia’s case a price 
ceiling is mandated through to 2018. 
 
At the same time TMG is also concerned with the price of allowances being too low.60 Notably 
the policy behind the TMG regime is predicated on a much higher price than both the current EU 
and Australian prices. However the ease with which the TMG caps have been met has meant that 
few trades have occurred61 and, with the large stock of excess reductions, downwards pressure 
on the price in the future could be expected notwithstanding the original policy intent and 
inefficiencies in the market framework. TMG might respond to this by intervening in the market 
to buy up or cancel allowances. Such a power is inconceivable under the Australian model with 
the repeal of the price floor mechanism following the agreement to link with the EU. 
 
59 Mace 2008 at paragraph 3.4.4. 
60 An influx of low priced allowances is feared: see Rudolph 2012 citing interviews with BOE officials. 
61 Such information is secret (unless voluntarily declared by market participants) although there is report of one 
trade at US$142 per tonne: Rudolph 2012 at section 3.2. TMG records reveal that while no trades in excess 
allowances occurred during FY2011 (the first year of possible trading) one occurred in FY2012 (as at 28/2/13) with 
a further eight trades in other forms of credits. Nine entities did convert excess reductions into tradable credits: 
apparently most entities have banked their excess allowances awaiting clarification as to commitment period two 
reduction obligations. Two attempts to auction credits by the TMG met with limited success – there were no 
expressions of interest on the first advertised occasion and only one sale on the subsequent occasion (at Y10,000 per 
tonne). Whilst the price at which private trades occurs is not publicly available the TMG auctions are meant to 
provide a price signal – preferred at between Y8,000 to Y10,000 (US$80 to $100) per tonne – based on survey 
information and an annual “matching” seminar. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the involvement of market place 
intermediaries will assist in establishing a market price. Notably no trades between Saitama and Tokyo based 
entities have occurred as at April 2013: Meeting with TMG officials 5 April 2013. 
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Borrowing 
The Australian intention to allow limited borrowing also differs from the TMG model. The 
opportunity for entities to borrow allowances from future periods asserts downwards pressure on 
the carbon price and can encourage entities to lobby for a relaxation of future targets and poses 
the risk that such entities may terminate their activities after having utilized their future 
allowances. However the tightness of the Australian limit on borrowing would minimise the 
downwards impact on price. Notably the Australian approach is stricter than the EU rules.62 
 
Banking 
Both regimes have liberal rules as to banking, namely the ability to use excess allowances in one 
period to meet obligations of future periods. However the TMG regime requires banked 
allowances from the first commitment period to be utilised in the second commitment period. It 
is understood that it is not proposed that the banking option be extended into the third 
commitment period. Notably, banking does not harm a scheme’s environmental credentials 
where it reflects mitigation methods or excess purchases over needs (rather than over-allocation 
of free allowances). 
 
Commitment and compliance periods 
TMG creates five year periods whereas the Australian regime requires reconciliation between 
emissions and allowances annually with the required emissions caps specified for each year five 
years in advance. The rationale for the longer Tokyo compliance period is said to be to facilitate 
companies meeting caps via longer term investments in energy conservation. 63 Given the 
Australian rules permitting banking and, especially, (limited) borrowing and the expected fluid 
market with trades possible from the commencement of the period this difference may be only 
cosmetic.  
 
Target stringency 
The TMG first commitment period caps (set at a 6% or 8% emissions reduction) appeared 
reasonably stringent at the outset of the regime but in the event they have been easily achieved. 
The second commitment reductions from 2015 have been foreshadowed as 17%. The Australian 
caps for when it was proposed to move to a full ETS have never been specified. It is understood 
that a uniform reduction obligation is envisaged (subject to specific industry concessions) 
whereas under the TMG ETS the 6% or 8% reduction factor in the first compliance period 
depends on the entity’s industry categorisation. 
 
62 A comparison of borrowing rules can be found at http://www.emissions-euets.com/borrowing (last visited 7 
March 2013). 
63 IETA Tokyo at 6. 
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It should be observed that it is not so much the level of the emissions target in each jurisdiction 
that sets the level of stringency but rather the relative shortage of emissions allowances that is 
created and hence the extent of the incentive to reduce emissions.  
 
The recognition of allowances from other schemes and jurisdictions 
Each ETS allows for offsets generated under certain domestic regimes. Furthermore, the 
Australian ETS allows for the limited used of Kyoto units and EU allowances whilst the TMG 
regime recognises allowances generated under the Saitama ETS. 64  Recognition of foreign 
allowances exerts downwards pressure on the carbon price, raises integrity concerns and 
(effectively) exports emission reduction activities resulting in less domestic reductions. The later 
is not necessarily an issue given the global nature of emissions. Where remissions are reduced 
does not matter from an environmental perspective. If the relative cost of abatement is less in one 
jurisdiction then focusing on reductions there first makes greater economic sense.  
 
The integrity of these external allowances is critical though. Jurisdictions need to be confident 
that they do, in fact, represent a real reduction in emissions. 
 
The lack of sanctions supporting compliance with the Saitama regime rendering it, effectively, 
voluntary could have a downwards influence on the carbon price in Tokyo. A similar downwards 
influence on the carbon price could be expected in Australia from recognising units from the 
large (currently over supplied) EU market. 
 
Notably, whilst the carbon price is around US$140 per tonne in Tokyo65 it is currently nearer 
US$5 and US$25 per tonne in the EU and Australia respectively. The price in Tokyo is clearly 
very high in relative terms this being possibly attributable to the trading mechanism engendering 
a lack of market liquidity and the already high Japanese energy efficiency so rendering further 
reductions more expensive.66 Nevertheless TMG is reluctant to recognise foreign allowances 
concerned that the availability of cheap foreign credits would drive down the price in Tokyo and 
lead to a reduced incentive to abate and less domestic reductions. 
 
This concern arises from taking a domestic rather than global perspective. Nevertheless, the 
concern might be ameliorated by placing limits on the amount of foreign credits that may be 
utilised with this limit reviewed on an ongoing basis.67 There are, in fact, precedents for this in 
the restriction placed by TMG on the proposed use of outside Tokyo credits and also by 
Australia on the use of Kyoto and other foreign credits. A similar restriction might achieve a 
64 There is mutual recognition as TMG allowances may be relied on by Saitama based entities. 
65 The first trades occurred in August 2010 at $142US per tonne: IETA Tokyo at 5. 
66 Ibid. 
67 An additional “fix” that might serve to partially offset the loss of abatement incentive arising from a price 
reduction would be to auction allowances rather than embrace free allocation. 
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compromise between the pursuit of domestic policy considerations whilst also allowing TMG to 
be part of a global network. 
 
There is a further reason why TMG might consider greater recognition of foreign allowances 
with some convergence of the carbon price. Tokyo based entities with an international clientele 
or competitors may suffer a competitive disadvantage if they face a carbon price far in excess of 
that experienced globally. The city is already branded as one of the most expensive in the 
World68 and any additional cost differential imposed on Tokyo based businesses will detract 
from its World financial centre prospects and renewed export endeavours. Carbon leakage is also 
conceivable, as discussed below. 
 
Level of compulsion, governance and enforcement 
Both regimes are mandatory with the TMG ETS subject to stringent monitoring, reporting and 
verification rules enforced by TMG officials at the Bureau of the Environment with the 
assistance of third party verifiers. Similarly, the Australian system established a regulator to 
attend to supervision and enforcement with the aid of independent auditors. The proposal is for 
the Australian rules to be based on international standards. Notably reports of especially large 
emitters would be audited before lodgement and the regulator had indicated that audits of other 
entities would be undertaken in specified circumstances. 
 
Sanctions for shortfalls 
The penalty regimes differ for each regime but both appear similarly stringent. Although the 
Australian penalty absolves entities from their obligations the penalty is set at twice the current 
market price thus preventing the penalty from acting as a de facto price cap. Similarly, the first 
level TMG penalty for excess emissions is a requirement to purchase 1.3 times the amount of 
allowances that would otherwise have been required (so again the penalty does not operate as a 
de facto price cap). 
 
Leakage control 
It is conceivable that facilities operating within the jurisdiction of TMG might relocate, effecting 
carbon leakage, a term coined to refer to the phenomenon where origin based carbon pricing 
leads to a reorientation of carbon emitting activities away from jurisdictions that price carbon to 
destinations that do not. In the absence of similar regimes operating throughout Japan the only 
way this possibility might be mitigated would be for TMG to provide some concessions for types 
of facilities most able or likely to relocate. This does not seem practical though and might raise 
equity considerations.  
 
68 Erica Ho, “And the World’s 10 most expensive cities of 2013 are” Time Newsfeed (6 February 2013) available at 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/02/06/and-the-worlds-10-most-expensive-cities-of-2013-are/ (last visited 7 April 
2013). 
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In contrast, Australia had provided trade exposed industries with concessions in order to 
minimise the chances of relocation and ensure that they remain internationally competitive. 
Many of these concessions were foreshadowed to expire or be pared back with the establishment 
of the full trading scheme subject to the responses in other jurisdictions, particularly potential 
linkage partners such as the EU and NZ.69  
 
Level of application and coverage 
The designers of an ETS must decide upon whom to impose the requirement to account for 
emissions through the purchase of allowances. There is a spectrum of possibilities from 
imposition on producers and importers of fuels, to those using the fuels to create energy and 
emitting greenhouse gases (primarily the energy suppliers and some manufacturers – making 
direct emissions accountable) through to where the ultimate consumer of a product or service 
may have to account for the indirect emissions embedded in the item or service (distinguished as 
upstream or downstream approaches).70 From a theoretical perspective the incentive effect away 
from emissions intensive activities should be the same as under either approach the ultimate 
consumer would be paying for the price on carbon, in the upstream approach the carbon price is 
reflected in the price of the fuel, energy, item or service. However the potentially wider coverage 
and administrative and compliance cost advantages of an upstream approach render it more 
attractive. 
 
The TMG regime operates further downstream in contrast to the Australian regime being more 
upstream in character directed at, fundamentally, energy creators. The downstream focus of the 
TMG regime, on large consumers of energy, results in its coverage extending primarily to 
commercial buildings, in particular, office towers. 71 A rationale for this downstream is that 
whilst around 40% of the energy consumed in Tokyo is electricity, 90% of that electricity is 
generated outside the jurisdiction of the TMG. 
 
Thus, in addition to being a more upstream regime, the Australian regime has a broader sectoral 
coverage than the TMG regime. Not only does it apply to energy generation facilities but also 
many industries such as aluminium production, steel manufacturing, pulp and paper 
manufacturing, glass making, cement production and petroleum refining are within its net. 
Furthermore, whilst the primary focus is on carbon dioxide emissions, four greenhouse gases in 
total are caught.72   
 
 
69 See the discussion at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1112a/12bd068 (last 
visited 8 March 2013). 
70 The OECD 2002 report describes an approach that caps emissions at the emissions level as “direct” and one where 
the ultimate consumers are held accountable for the emissions embedded in the goods or services they consume as 
“indirect”: see paragraph 3.3.  
71 Around 80% buildings and the balance factories: BOE 2010 at page 11. 
72 The others are methane, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbon from aluminum smelting.  
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Allocation of allowances 
Essentially two methods can be adopted to allocate allowances. A government might sell them 
through a competitive auctioning process or allowances could be allocated free of charge in 
proportion to the entity’s past emissions (grandfathering). In the case of grandfathering an 
optional feature is for each entity’s allocation proportion of the total allowances to be adjusted up 
or down in the next period on the basis of an increase or decrease in its activity level (updating).   
 
The allocation method needs to be such as to not affect the legitimacy of the system as a whole. 
The possibility of windfall profits to market participants is a risk with free (over) allocation. In 
the case of an auctioning system care must be taken to ensure that the auctions operate with 
market efficiency and integrity in mind. In particular, competitive or collusive conduct by 
bidders at an auction must be avoided.73 Auctioning in one jurisdiction where the allowances are 
freely allocated in another can lead to competitive distortions between competing enterprises.  
 
The TMG regime adopts the grandfathering method of allocating allowances in contrast to the 
Australian auctioning proposal. Although some competitiveness issues could arise, in reality, 
limited direct competition is likely between the entities affected in each jurisdiction.74 
 
New entrants and business closure 
The TMG regime has developed detailed rules for the treatment of new entrants and business 
closure. There is less necessity for specific rules in Australia as the general structure of the 
regime would accommodate most issues relating to new entrants and business closure.75 
 
Registries and trading mechanism 
Both TMG and Australian allowances are expressed in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide although 
various conversion factors are used in each jurisdiction. The TMG system (relying on a website 
to provide for bilateral trades of allowances first certified by TMG as excess) results in high 
transactions costs and inefficiencies and may warrant revision. The Australian system provides 
for registration and online trading.  
 
Kyoto units 
Jurisdictions that remain parties to the Kyoto Protocol may wish to ensure that any allowances 
acquired from a foreign source are backed by Kyoto units, which can then count towards the 
country’s international emissions reduction obligations, and that their allowances are similarly 
73 Mace 2008 at paragraph 3.7.1. Also see M. J. Mace and J. Anderson, “Transnational aspects of a linked carbon 
market”, (2008) 2 Carbon and Climate Review 190. 
74 There may be some potential for competition, for example between Australian steel mills and those operating in 
the TMG area. However, as discussed, most trade exposed Australian industries are being provided with some 
protection under the ETS arrangements. 
75 The structure of the TMG regime (especially free allocation and coverage dependent on consumption of energy 
not level of emissions) mandates the need for complex “new entrants” and “business slow down / closure” rules. 
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backed.76 The Australian regime does not specify whether its allowances would be shadowed by 
Kyoto units although this would be an expected measure. Although there is no foreign dimension 
to the TMG regime it would not be clear, in any event, how a sub-national entity, such as TMG, 
could generate a transfer of Japanese Kyoto units.77  
 
Linkage partners 
The Kyoto Protocol envisages that the various national and sub-national ETSs would be linked to 
form a global market for carbon. This would allow global emissions to be reduced in the most 
cost effective manner with those jurisdictions where the marginal cost of abatement is lowest 
most likely to generate excess credits for sale globally. As emissions know no jurisdictional 
boundaries ultimately it does not matter where the abatement occurs, just that it occurs. 
 
Linkage, though, involves considerable integrity and administrative issues. Furthermore, the 
level of ambition reflected in the compromise between environmental objectives and cost 
containment in each jurisdiction’s ETS is likely to vary. Linkage will have the effect of settling 
all linked regimes at, or towards, the level of the regime with the weakest environmental 
objectives as that jurisdiction’s regime will exert downwards pressure on the carbon price.  
 
Importantly, whilst the detail of a regime’s features may render it more or less compatible with 
another regime few, if any, features will deny the ability to link as legal “workarounds” are 
typically available.78 Political acceptability and, indeed, political will are much more significant 
to the decision whether two regimes might link especially as with linkage comes a (partial) loss 
of control by each government over its domestic ETS and the potential to “import” market 
imperfections.79 
 
Notably Tokyo has linked with Saitama which jurisdiction has implemented a similar, although 
voluntary regime. Australia has proposed a link with the EU. This was a significant decision 
given the collapse in the carbon price in the EU and the differences in the relative sizes of the 
markets with the expected result that the EU market will dominate and Australia will be a price 
taker. The resultant downwards pressure on the price would be ameliorated by the proposed 50% 
76 Linking to or between systems outside the Kyoto Protocol is feasible although not contributing to a negotiation of 
a global burden sharing regime: see Andreas Tuerk, Michael Mehling, Christian Flachsland, Wolfgang Sterk, 
“Linking carbon markets: concepts, case studies and pathways”, (2009) 9 Climate Policy 341 – 357 at 344 – 345 
(“Tuerk at al (2009)”). 
77 Note that Japan has withdrawn from the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
78 It has been suggested that the Australian regime is designed to be readily linked to other ETSs: “Australia. The 
World’s carbon markets: a case study guide to emissions trading” Environmental Defense Fund, International 
Emissions Trading Association, June 2013 at 8 available at 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_australia_case_study_september_2
013.pdf (last visited 5 March 2014). 
79 Generally see Christian Flachsland, Robert Marschinski and Ottmar Edenhofer, “To link or not to link: benefits 
and disadvantages of linking cap-and-trade systems” (2009) 9 Climate Policy 358. The authors generate a useful 
table (Table 2) summarizing the potential advantages and disadvantages of linking. 
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limit on the use of international permits although the removal of the proposed price floor was a 
significant concession to the Europeans. It is suspected that the then Labor Government, facing 
an election, hastened forward this decision to lock Australia into an international framework in 
the hope that this would make repeal of the regime less viable if it lost government. Furthermore, 
the Government hoped that the forecast fall in the carbon price would resonate with the 
community concerned at the relative discrepancy in the price between Australia and the EU 
during the Australian regime’s fixed price period. 
 
5.0 Philosophical differences between the regimes 
It might be suggested that the Australian and TMG regimes have a fundamental philosophical 
difference. The Australian regime is premised on harnessing market forces to bring about 
emissions reductions, from the initial allocation of allowances via auction through to the 
unfettered right to immediately trade in these allowances. An entity’s right to emit carbon 
dioxide is then based on the allowances it holds at the due date for surrender. In contrast, the 
TMG regime has greater regulatory involvement and might be more aptly described as a 
reductions (not allowances) system. Reduction targets are specified and only if these are met to 
the satisfaction of TMG may any excess reductions then be converted to allowances which can 
be traded. 
 
Essentially though, apart from timing issues as to when credits are available for trading (upon the 
initial allocation or acquisition in Australia; only upon application once excess reductions for an 
annual compliance period are verified in Tokyo) both systems are focused on generating a 
financial incentive to reduce emissions. The “asset” that a TMG entity with verified excess 
reductions acquires may be disposed of to another entity, providing the recipient with a right to 
greater emissions. In this sense both regimes provide for trading in emissions allowances, only 
the TMG regime is post the event in the sense that an entity must already have a verifiable excess 
in emissions reductions rather than a mere expectation that it has excess allowances that it can 
trade.80 
 
It is understood that TMG’s ETS has been carefully crafted to avoid creating property rights that 
might otherwise raise the prospect that the TMG has exceeded its constitutional powers. Article 
29(2) of the Japanese Constitution can be interpreted as stating that “Property rights shall be 
defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.” Even though the word “law” is used in 
the English version of the Constitution, the word houritsu is used in the original Japanese text. 
An interpretation of houritsu is a statute formally legislated by the national government. On this 
interpretation only the national government is able to make property rights and a local 
80 It has, therefore, been suggested elsewhere by the author that any philosophical differences should not amount to a 
barrier to linking the two regimes although it is conceded that the requirement for TMG to verify reductions prior to 
a tradable asset emerging and the subsequent mechanism for trading may hinder trades across a linked market: Justin 
Dabner, “Linking the Australian and TMG emissions trading schemes” unpublished paper. 
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government like TMG has no such power. In order to avoid this obstacle, TMG did not introduce 
emission allowances, which could be deemed as a kind of property right. Instead, as noted above, 
the TMG regime introduced the concept of “exceeding credits” for emissions reductions 
exceeding a baseline which credits might be transferred to a facility that has not meet its 
reduction obligations.81 
 
The vision within TMG is that the TMG regime is the first of what will become a network of tier 
two ETSs implemented by local governments and major cities throughout Japan. These will 
support a first tier regime instigated by the national Government. 
 
6.0 Particular lessons presented by the two regimes 
Whilst an ETS is premised on a market induced reduction in emissions governments appear 
reluctant to completely give up control in favour of market forces. A concern with cost 
containment and price stability necessitates the reservation of a right to intervene and manipulate 
the market. Thus ETS design typically places constraints or limits on the free rein of market 
forces. 
 
In the Australian context this is most readily demonstrated by the phasing in features of the 
regime that has seen it operate at a fixed price to date with trading due to commence from 1 July 
2014. Fixing the price satisfies both the cost containment and price stability criteria whilst also 
allowing business and the government an opportunity to ease towards a full market regime. This 
was particularly important given the experience in the EU where the initial over supply of 
permits (partly due to the economic downturn) has collapsed the market price and damaged the 
environmental credentials of the ETS. 
 
The TMG experience also illustrates the importance of a gradual lead in to implementing a full 
market based ETS. For almost a decade before the ETS was introduced TMG embarked on steps 
towards it through a carbon reduction reporting program and voluntary reductions thereby 
building up capacity, a knowledge base and a relationship with the entities involved. This has 
allowed TMG to establish both an advisory function and a certification program whereby it can 
reward those entities implementing exceptional energy consumption measures. 82 It has been 
suggested that this advisory function and the certification program may be the main factors in the 
high level of reductions to date rather than the operation of the market.83 
 
81 Emails from Professor Satoshi Kurokawa, Professor of Environmental Law & Administrative Law, Waseda 
University, School of Social Sciences dated 22 November 2012 and 4 November 2013. 
82 With reduced reduction targets resulting in the likelihood of excess reductions which can then be traded at a 
profit. 
83 Niederhafner 2013 at 16 – 22. 
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In addition, the TMG experience demonstrates an even greater concern to maintain some control 
over the market by the fact that tradable allowances are not available until TMG has itself 
confirmed that the required reductions have been achieved. Furthermore, the five year 
compliance window generates an expectation that entities should have a greater opportunity to 
put in place measures that will ensure the mandated reductions. The market is, thus, more a back-
up to permit participants to acquire allowances to avoid punishment and thereby takes a 
secondary role in driving emissions reductions in contrast to the Australian regime. Notably the 
restrictions on the generation of tradable allowances (ex ante and then only 50% of reductions) 
and limits on the availability of offsets may well result in an undersupply issue in stark contrast 
to the EU experience, a possibility to which TMG’s reservation of emergency measures is 
directed. 
 
Finally, the regimes present an instructive contrast in the political economy experience. Whilst 
the governing party of the TMG has recently changed there has been no suggestion of a 
reconsideration of the ETS. This is in stark contrast to the Australian experience. One 
explanation could be that the gradual introduction of the ETS and TMG’s advisory function 
ensured community consensus. Maybe Japan’s unique group orientated culture is at play. The 
lack of divisiveness in relation to the regime is even more remarkable given that it was 
implemented during and following a lengthy period of economic malaise, was shortly followed 
by the economic and social upheaval caused by the triple disasters and the carbon price is 
exceptionally high on global standards. 
 
The Australian ETS experience dates from 2007. The election campaign of November of that 
year saw both major parties promoting an ETS and the new prime minister referring to the need 
to combat climate change as the greatest moral crisis facing the country. Yet, in less than three 
years both parties were contesting the next election on no carbon tax/ETS platforms. The 
subsequent introduction of an ETS (on the insistence of the Green party on whom Labor relied 
after the election to retain government) was viewed by many in the community as a betrayal of 
the pre-election promise. A spirited destabilisation campaign by conservative, business and 
climate change sceptic forces, supported by the unfolding ETS debacle in Europe, the perceived 
intransience of other nations to adopt an ETS and a forecast decline in the country’s economic 
performance railed against the fledgling regime. Its unpopularity was to embolden the new 
conservative government elected in 2013 to press the argument that it had a mandate to repeal it.  
 
The difficulties of introducing a complicated regulatory scheme such as an ETS are well 
recognised.84 The unfortunate reality is that the true facts were the first casualty in the debate 
over the regime. The arguments about its impact on trade exposed industries ignored the copious 
84 Discussed and referenced in the paper by Sven Rudolph and Takeshi, “Tokyo’s greenhouse gas emissions trading 
scheme: a model for sustainable megacity carbon markets?” available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/mar/magkse/201225.html (last visited 13 November 2012). 
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concessions for such industries and exemption of agriculture. The arguments about the cost to 
the community ignored the generous compensation handed out to families and small business. 
The arguments that ETSs were not being adopted elsewhere ignored developments in the US, 
China, Korea and Japan amongst others. The argument that the carbon price was too high 
ignored the likely impact of linking with the EU. The argument that once linked it would 
encourage emissions abatement overseas but not domestically ignored the reality that emissions 
know no jurisdictional boundaries. The argument that it had caused a huge spike in energy costs 
ignored the other factors impacting on electricity prices, especially the increased expenditure on 
capital investment. The government had created a Climate Change Commission empowered to 
educate and bring the community along. Staffed with scientists and issuing complex reports on 
the need to address climate change, it was spectacularly unsuccessful vis-à-vis the 
misinformation propounded by the general media, much of which was on a mission to replace 
the government.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
The TMG scheme has been recognised as fulfilling most of the requirements for a sustainable 
ETS. Whilst improvements by way of extending gas and sector coverage, tightening the caps 
given that much of the mandated reductions have already been met, phasing in auctions rather 
than grandfathering and freeing up the allowances market might be suggested,85 it is uncontested 
that there has been a 23% reduction in emissions by the covered entities since its inception. 
Given the effect of external factors, such as the economic crisis and triple disasters, as well as the 
lag effect of the TMG initiatives before and outside of the ETS, it is difficult to identify exactly 
how successful it has been.86 Certainly very few trades have occurred87 but this is likely to 
change as the compliance period draws to a close and, in any event, as explained above, trading 
may be a less integral part of the scheme than an ETS that recognises tradable permits from the 
date of commencement. 
 
The legislative and administrative features of the Australian system appear similarly robust. 
Much would depend, though, on the level of stringency established by its emissions caps. Any 
continued level of assistance and concessions for some industry sectors would also be important 
in assessing the environmental credentials of the regime. The transition into a trading regime and, 
particularly, the linkage with the EU are challenges that are yet to be met and, indeed, may never 
be. How the environmental integrity of the Australian ETS could be quarantined from the 
oversupply infecting the EU regime would be a particular challenge. 
 
85 Rudolph 2012 at section 4. 
86 Although TMG asserts that much of the reduction is due to measures undertaken by covered entities: The Tokyo 
cap-and-trade program achieved 23% reduction in the 2nd year, TMG media release, 21 January 2013. 
87 Only 17 trades had occurred in the first 29 months of the commitment period: Niederhafner 2013 at 14. 
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The philosophical difference reflected by the TMG and Australian approaches presents two 
options to other jurisdictions contemplating an ETS. The choice between the two centres on the 
primacy wished to be given to market forces and the desirability of promoting domestic 
reductions in emissions albeit that the marginal cost of abatement might be higher than in other 
jurisdictions. Thus the TMG regime seeks to impose a regulatory structure to mandate local 
emissions reductions with the trading mechanism secondary. The TMG regime might, therefore, 
be easier to promote to local constituents although businesses might see it imposing a greater 
cost burden than an Australian type ETS where the market is more liquid and open to foreign 
entrants.  
 
Unfortunately there are unlikely to be many more lessons provided by the Australian ETS as the 
prospects for both regimes appear very different. Whilst the TMG regime is being promoted as a 
template for other jurisdictions, both within and outside Japan, and might even provide stimulus 
for action at the National level, the continuance of the Australian regime past 30 June 2014 looks 
perilous. The success or otherwise of the proposal of the new Government to repeal it rests in the 
hands of minority parties due to take control of the upper house after that date. 
 
Irrespective of the short-term political outcome in Australia the global momentum is towards 
enacting such regimes. No doubt both the features of the TMG and Australian regimes identified 
in this paper will be examined by policy analysts in other countries as they embark on their ETS 
adventure. The need to phase the regime in gradually and bring the community along whilst 
maintaining greater price control (at least initially) may be particular lessons to note. 
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